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Dinstein: The Right to Humanitarian Assistance

THE RIGHT TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
Yoram Dinstein

I

t is impossible to assert, at the present point, that a general right to humanitarian assistance has actually crystallized in positive international law. Such a
general right, had it consolidated, could be invoked in all circumstances: in
peacetime (either in the face of endemic problems of famine, malnutrition, and
disease, or—perhaps especially—when natural disasters occur) as well as in the
course of armed conflicts (either international or internal). In reality, however,
there is no clear-cut right under existing international law to humanitarian as1
sistance in peacetime, not even when natural disasters strike. To the extent that
the right to humanitarian assistance is vouchsafed by binding norms of international law (customary or conventional), this is so only in certain contexts of
2
armed conflict.
During an armed conflict (whether international or
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There are principally three scenarios in which the issue of humanitarian assistance may come into focus in armed conflict (whether international or
internal).

• A belligerent party controlling the territory inhabited by civilians possesses
the essential provisions required and, given good will, could distribute
them without undue difficulty to meet the demand. Yet, it pursues a
deliberate policy of denying supplies to those in need (primarily, enemy
civilians or persecuted minorities).

• Essential provisions are available to a belligerent party that is desirous of
distributing them to the civilians in need, but distribution is obstructed by
the enemy.

• Essential provisions within the territory controlled by a belligerent party
are generally scarce, or the distribution system has collapsed owing to the
ravages of the armed conflict.
In the first two instances, the situation can be remedied by the belligerents
themselves (acting alone or in tandem). In the third, humanitarian relief can
come only from outside sources—neutral states or charitable nongovernmental
organizations—which must gain access to the afflicted area.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
It is useful, at least from the perspective of juridical theory, to distinguish in
armed conflict between a right of the civilian beneficiaries to demand or obtain
humanitarian assistance and a right of states (or impartial humanitarian organizations, like the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross]) to insist
on providing such assistance.3 Should it be recognized that civilians have a right
to demand or obtain humanitarian assistance, it is necessary to pinpoint the
party bearing the corresponding duty to render that assistance. In the first two
instances mentioned above, a duty can be imposed by international law on one
or another of the belligerent parties. In the third instance, the situation is more
complex. Surely, civilians do not have an absolute right to demand relief from
the outside, applicable erga omnes (that is, vis-B-vis the entire international
community). In other words, it would be absurd to contend that every state in
the world is duty bound to come up, on demand, with relief aid to civilians em4
broiled in any armed conflict, wherever it is raging. However, if relief is offered
by a neutral state (or an impartial humanitarian organization), civilians may
have a right to insist that shipments reach their destination, and belligerents may
have a corresponding duty to enable free passage. Moreover, the neutral state
may have a right vis-B-vis the belligerents—and, as circumstances dictate,
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vis-B-vis other neutral states through whose territories the shipments must be
routed—to expect that relief consignments will actually be allowed to get
through to the civilian beneficiaries.
SETTINGS FOR HUMANITARIAN AID
No customary norm has so far crystallized in the international law of armed
conflict to establish a general right to humanitarian assistance (of whatever
type) solely because provisions are scarce. It is, therefore, proposed to address
here different factual settings arising in armed conflict. Each presents its own
problems and its own solutions. These discrete settings are: occupied territories,
siege warfare, maritime blockade, aliens in the territory of a party to the conflict,
general relief supplies from the outside, and noninternational armed conflicts.
Additional issues to be discussed are germane to enforcement measures and the
responsibility of the Security Council of the United Nations.
Occupied Territory
When enemy territory is subject to belligerent occupation, the legal position as
regards humanitarian assistance to the local civilian population is the clearest.
Article 55(1) of the 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War prescribes that “[T]o the fullest extent of the
means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food
and medical supplies of the population; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores, and other articles if the resources of the occu5
pied territory are inadequate.”
The authoritative ICRC commentary on this convention sets forth that
according to article 55(1), the occupying power incurs “a definite obligation to maintain at a reasonable level the material conditions under which
6
the population of the occupied territory lives.” Article 69(1) of the 1977
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), broadens the list of objects specified in article 55(1) by itemizing also
clothing, bedding, means of shelter, and any other supplies essential to the
7
survival of the civilian population.
In employing the phrase “[T]o the fullest extent of the means available to it”
in Article 55(1) of Geneva Convention (IV), as well as in article 69(1) of Protocol I, the framers of the two instruments show their awareness of the predicaments in which the occupying power is likely to find itself in time of armed
conflict (indeed, it may itself be exposed to a maritime blockade imposed by the
enemy). Assuming a paucity of supplies at hand, the question is whether the occupying power must allow humanitarian relief (when offered) from the outside.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2000

3

Naval War College Review, Vol. 53 [2000], No. 4, Art. 7
80

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Article 59(1)–(2) of Geneva Convention (IV) sets forth that “[I]f the whole or
part of the population of an occupied territory is inadequately supplied, the Occupying Power shall agree to relief schemes on behalf of the said population, and
shall facilitate them by all the means at its disposal. Such schemes, which may be
undertaken either by States or by impartial humanitarian organizations such as
the International Committee of the Red Cross, shall consist, in particular, of the
8
provision of consignments of foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing.”
As stressed in the ICRC commentary on article 59, the obligation imposed on
the occupying power to enable such relief consignments to reach the civilian
9
population “is unconditional.”
A violation of article 59 of Geneva Convention (IV) is not enumerated in ar10
ticle 147 as one of the “grave breaches” of the convention. On the other hand,
“wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions” is categorized as a war crime in article 8(b)(xxv) of the 1998 Rome Statute
11
of the International Criminal Court (which is not yet in force).
Siege Warfare
The legality of siege warfare was not contested in classical international law; the
legitimacy of attempting to reduce a besieged place through starvation was “not
12
questioned.” Article 17 of the Geneva Convention (IV) deals with siege warfare
in a very peripheral way, proclaiming, “The Parties to the conflict shall
endeavour to conclude local agreements for the removal from besieged or encircled areas, of wounded, sick, infirm, and aged persons, children and maternity
cases, and for the passage of ministers of all religions, medical personnel and
13
medical equipment on their way to such areas.” Obviously, only limited categories of civilians benefit from this stipulation. Besides, “[T]he words ‘The
Parties to the conflict shall endeavour’ show that under the Convention evacuation is not compulsory”; article 17 amounts merely to a strong recommendation to belligerents to conclude an agreement effecting the removal of
those enumerated.14
The legal position is radically altered in article 54 of Additional Protocol I,
which reads:
1. Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.
2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable
to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for
the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and
supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their
sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the
motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or
for any other motive.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol53/iss4/7

4

Dinstein: The Right to Humanitarian Assistance
DINSTEIN

81

3. The prohibitions in paragraph 2 shall not apply to such of the objects covered by
it as are used by an adverse Party:
(a) as sustenance solely for the members of its armed forces; or
(b) if not as sustenance, then in direct support of military action, provided, however, that in no event shall actions against these objects be taken which may
be expected to leave the civilian population with such inadequate food or water as to cause its starvation or force its movement.

15

The starvation of civilians is not enumerated in Protocol I itself as a “grave
16
breach” (and therefore a war crime). Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that article
8(2)(b)(xxv) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court includes
the following in the list of war crimes: “Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their
survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the
17
Geneva Conventions.” The last words are of particular importance, inasmuch
as they specifically stigmatize as a war crime a deliberate denial of humanitarian
assistance in breach of the Geneva Conventions.
A siege laid to a defended town (inhabited by civilians) must be distinguished
18
from one encircling a military fortress. In the latter case, since the sustenance
only of members of the enemy armed forces is at stake, starvation is a legitimate
method of warfare, and it is permissible to destroy systematically all foodstuffs
that can be of use to the besieged. By contrast, in the former case, inasmuch as civilians are directly affected, starvation and the destruction of foodstuffs are interdicted. In conformity with Protocol I, “A food supply needed by the civilian
population does not lose its protection simply because it is also used by the
armed forces and may technically qualify as a military objective. It has to be used
19
exclusively by them to lose its immunity.” Yet, even pursuant to article 54 of the
protocol, the besieging force can probably prevent supplies from getting
20
through if civilians are guaranteed safe passage out of the besieged area.
Maritime Blockade
Article 23(1) of Geneva Convention (IV) enunciates, “Each High Contracting
Party shall allow the free passage of all consignments of medical and hospital
stores and objects necessary for religious worship intended only for civilians of
another High Contracting Party, even if the latter is its adversary. It shall likewise permit the free passage of all consignments of essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended for children under fifteen, expectant mothers and
21
maternity cases.”
Although no explicit reference to blockade is made in article 23(1), there is no
22
doubt that blockade constitutes the background of this clause. The obligation
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created in it is extremely limited in scope. Apart from being subjected to various
conditions spelt out in other paragraphs of article 23, free passage of consignments for all civilians is confined to medications, and other items (food and
clothing) are circumscribed to certain segments of the population deemed sin23
gularly vulnerable. There is plainly no requirement to allow the supply of food
24
and clothing to the civilian population in general.
Other provisions pertaining to blockades appear in article 59(3)–(4) of the
Convention. Paragraph (3) states that “[A]ll Contracting Parties shall permit the
free passage of these consignments
It would be absurd to contend that every state and shall guarantee their protecin the world is duty bound to come up, on de- tion.”25 According to paragraph (4),
mand, with relief aid to civilians embroiled in “[A] Power granting free passage to
consignments on their way to terriany armed conflict, wherever it is raging.
tory occupied by an adverse Party to
the conflict shall, however, have the right to search the consignments, to regulate
their passage according to prescribed times and routes, and to be reasonably satisfied through the Protecting Power that these consignments are to be used for
the relief of the needy population and are not to be used for the benefit of the
26
Occupying Power.” These stipulations must, of course, be read together with
paragraphs (1) and (2) of article 59 quoted above, dealing with relief consignments to occupied territories. Paragraph (3) is viewed by the ICRC commentary
as “the keystone of the whole system”; its thrust is that such consignments must
27
be allowed to cross through a blockade, subject to verification and supervision.
The prohibition—incorporated, as noted, in Protocol I—of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare does not by itself render blockade unlawful as a
method of warfare, provided that such starvation is not the sole purpose of the
28
blockade. This follows from the language of article 49(3) of the Protocol: “The
provisions of this Section [articles 48–67] apply to any land, air or sea warfare
which may affect the civilian population, individual civilians or civilian objects
on land. They further apply to all attacks from the sea or from the air against objectives on land but do not otherwise affect the rules of international law appli29
cable in armed conflict at sea or in the air.”
As the ICRC commentary on the protocol explains the paragraph, “In general
the delegates at the Diplomatic Conference were guided by a concern not to undertake a revision of the rules applicable to armed conflict at sea or in the air.
This is why the words ‘on land’ were retained and a second sentence clearly indicating that the Protocol did not change international law applicable in such situ30
ations was added.”
Even those advocating the illegality of a blockade giving rise to starvation of
civilians are forced to concede that their position collides head-on with the
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original intention of the diplomatic conference that the instrument it produced
31
have no impact on the law of blockades.
Aliens
As far as aliens in the territory of a party to the conflict are concerned, article
38(1) of Geneva Convention (IV) confers upon them the right “to receive the in32
dividual or collective relief that may be sent to them.” As the ICRC commentary expounds:
Relief as meant here will consist, for example, of consignments of food, clothing and
medical supplies sent to the protected persons individually or collectively. Such consignments may come either from the country of origin of the protected persons or
from any other country and may be sent by private individuals, humanitarian organizations or governments.
The right of protected persons to receive relief implies an obligation of the country of
residence to allow the consignments to enter its territory and to pass them on intact
33
to the addressee.

Relief from the Outside
Article 70 of Protocol I pronounces:
1. If the civilian population of any territory under the control of a Party to the conflict, other than occupied territory, is not adequately provided with the supplies
mentioned in Article 69, relief actions which are humanitarian and impartial in
character and conducted without any adverse distinction shall be undertaken,
subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned in such relief actions. Offers of
such relief shall not be regarded as an interference in the armed conflict or as unfriendly acts. In the distribution of relief consignments, priority shall be given to
those persons, such as children, expectant mothers, maternity cases and nursing
mothers, who, under the Fourth Convention or under this Protocol, are to be accorded privileged treatment or special protection.
2. The Parties to the conflict and each High Contracting Party shall allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment and personnel provided in accordance with this Section, even if such assistance is destined
for the civilian population of the Adverse Party.
3. The Parties to the conflict and each High Contracting Party which allow the passage of relief consignments, equipment and personnel in accordance with paragraph 2:
(a) shall have the right to prescribe the technical arrangements, including search,
under which such passage is permitted;
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(b) may make such permission conditional on the distribution of this assistance being made under the local supervision of a Protecting Power;
(c) shall, in no way whatsoever, divert relief consignments from the purpose for
which they are intended nor delay their forwarding, except in cases of urgent
necessity in the interest of the civilian population concerned.
4. The Parties to the conflict shall protect relief consignments and facilitate their
rapid distribution.
5. The Parties to the conflict and each High Contracting Party concerned shall encourage and facilitate effective international co-ordination of the relief actions re34

ferred to in paragraph 1.

In contradistinction to article 23(1) of Geneva Convention (IV) cited earlier,
article 70(1) of Protocol I “expands relief entitlement to the whole population,
35
and not only to vulnerable segments” thereof. Furthermore, article 70(1) employs the phrase “shall be undertaken,” which—when taken alone—“clearly implies an obligation to accept relief offers meeting the requirements mentioned in
36
the article.” However, one cannot disregard the glaring fact that implementation
of the implied obligation is explicitly subject to an agreement between the parties
concerned. “Consent—the expression of sovereignty—is hence a basic principle in
37
the exercise of the right to humanitarian assistance in armed conflicts.”
As long as an agreement by all concerned lies at the root of relief actions, one
cannot speak of a genuine obligation to allow, or a genuine right to obtain, humanitarian assistance. At best, article 70(1) may be construed as precluding re38
fusal of agreement to relief for arbitrary or capricious reasons. Regrettably,
there are a host of nonarbitrary and practical reasons that can be invoked by a
belligerent in armed conflict if it chooses to withhold its consent from the delivery of relief supplies to civilians. The upshot is that the framers of article 70(1)
created “the impression of an ironclad obligation, and at the same time took the
bite out of that rule.”39
Noninternational Armed Conflicts
For the legal position in noninternational armed conflicts, it is necessary to consult two sources. First, there is common article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, which states, “An impartial humanitarian body, such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to
40
the conflict.” Undeniably, the pivotal word here is “offer.” Hence, the parties to
41
the conflict can always choose to decline it.
The second source is the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-Inter42
national Armed Conflicts (Protocol II). Article 14 of Protocol II prohibits both
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starvation of civilians as a method of combat and attacking objects indispens43
able to the survival of the civilian population. However, it must be taken into
account that the 1998 Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court—
which, as mentioned, brands as a war crime the starvation of civilians in an international armed conflict (includEven those advocating the illegality of a block- i n g t h e d e l i b e r a te d e n i a l o f
humanitarian relief supplies as proade giving rise to starvation of civilians are
vided for by the Geneva Convenforced to concede that their position collides
head-on with the original intention of the dip- tions)—does not treat in the same
manner the starvation of civilians in
lomatic conference.
a noninternational armed conflict.
44
The omission was by no means accidental. It is conspicuous in light of the long
catalogue of war crimes in internal armed conflicts encompassed in article 8 of
45
the statute.
Article 18 of Protocol II prescribes:
1. Relief societies located in the territory of the High Contracting Party, such as Red
Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) organizations, may offer their services for
the performance of their traditional functions in relation to the victims of the
armed conflict. . . .
2. If the civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to a lack of the supplies essential for its survival, such as foodstuffs and medical supplies, relief actions for the civilian population which are of an exclusively humanitarian and
impartial nature and which are conducted without any adverse distinction shall be
46

undertaken subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned.

A leading role in the field of international humanitarian assistance is tradi47
tionally played by the ICRC. Yet, interestingly enough, article 18 of Protocol II
does not mention the ICRC by name. Thus, if one looks for a legal niche to accommodate the ICRC, it is necessary to fall back upon common article 3. “Paradoxically, it can thus be said that in this respect it is common article 3 which
48
‘develops and supplements’ the Protocol rather than vice versa.”
Article 18(2) appropriately imposes the condition of nondiscrimination in
the distribution of humanitarian assistance from the outside; supplies cannot be
sent solely to one section of the civilian population and be denied to other
groups. But once more, the core issue is that of consent, which is emphatically
required. The ICRC commentary suggests that if the survival of the civilian
population is threatened, the authorities responsible cannot withhold their
consent without good grounds (implying that such action would constitute a
49
violation of article 14). The trouble is that as long as consent is essential, those
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authorities can usually find plausible excuses for delaying humanitarian assistance, and even for frustrating it altogether.
UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
Occasionally, the Security Council of the United Nations adopts resolutions
calling upon the parties to an armed conflict to allow unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies to civilians. Such calls must be analyzed carefully. More often than not, they are couched in merely hortatory terms, as recommendations,
in which case they do not per se introduce any change in the legal situation.
Where relief is contingent on the consent of the parties concerned, consent remains the crux of the issue. Still, at times the Security Council resorts to binding
language, citing specifically chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations
(devoted to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security).50 Pursuant to article 25 of the Charter, all members of the United Nations
must “accept and carry out” the decisions of the Security Council, in accordance
51
with the Charter. It is not entirely clear which decisions of the Council are cov52
ered by article 25, but decisions under chapter VII are indisputably binding.
Thus, when the Security Council decides to exercise the powers vested in it by
virtue of chapter VII, the legal rights and obligations of the parties to the conflict
undergo a fundamental transformation; their freedom of action is curtailed.
It is only natural that the Security Council tends to move gradually in this
field (as in others), first urging parties (in a nonbinding fashion) to allow unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies to civilians, and only subsequently
(when its appeal remains unheeded) moving to assert itself under chapter VII in
a binding fashion and even imposing sanctions. A good illustration can be
found in a series of resolutions of 1992 relating to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Security Council first adopted Resolution 752, simply calling upon the parties to
ensure that conditions be established for the effective and unhindered delivery
53
of humanitarian assistance. Then, the Security Council demanded in Resolution 757—specifically referring to chapter VII—that the parties immediately
54
create these conditions. In Resolution 770, the Security Council—again acting
under chapter VII—expressed its determination to create as soon as possible the
necessary conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance wherever re55
quired in Bosnia-Herzegovina. When all else failed, the Security Council decided, in Resolution 781, to establish a ban on military flights in the airspace of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, considering the measure to constitute “an essential element
56
for the safety of the delivery of humanitarian assistance.” It is possible to say that
in Bosnia-Herzegovina the protection of humanitarian aid became “the de facto
57
raison d’être of the UN mission.”
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THE USE OF FORCE TO ENSURE RELIEF
A separate question is whether forcible measures can be used against a state contravening the right to humanitarian assistance (in the specific circumstances in
which that right exists). There is a school of thought holding that states may use
force at their discretion to coerce a recalcitrant nation to respect international hu58
manitarian law (so-called “humanitarian intervention”). However, “humanitarian intervention is not an exception to the [UN] Charter prohibitions on the use
59
of force.” The Charter prohibits any use of unilateral force in interstate relations,
60
except in circumstances of self-defense in response to an armed attack. The International Court of Justice in 1986, in the Nicaragua case, rejected the notion that
forcible humanitarian intervention is permissible on a unilateral basis.61
On the other hand, article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations instructs the
Security Council to determine when a
62
Inaction by the Security Council does not
threat to the peace occurs. Upon
amount to authorization for collective security
concluding that a situation amounts
measures, even by a regional organization.
to a threat to the peace, the Security
Council is empowered to resort to enforcement action against the state concerned. “[A] threat to the peace in the sense of
63
Article 39 seems to be whatever the Security Council says is a threat to the peace.”
The Security Council definitely can decide that the deliberate blocking of humanitarian assistance to civilians in dire need of it amounts to a threat to the peace and
that an enforcement action is the proper remedy.
Indeed, in Resolution 794 (1992), the Security Council authorized member
states to use “all necessary means” to establish “a secure environment for hu64
manitarian relief operations in Somalia.” The expression “all necessary means”
has become a commonly employed euphemism for the use of force (which indeed followed, in the Somalia case, although success proved elusive).
Pursuant to article 53(1) of the Charter, the Security Council can, where appropriate, utilize regional organizations “for enforcement action under its au65
thority.” Article 53(1) does not diminish from the monopoly of the Security
Council, as established in the Charter, in the realm of collective security. The legality of the enforcement action by a regional organization is entirely contingent
66
on Security Council authorization. The Security Council can launch or approve a genuine humanitarian intervention, in order to counter breaches of the
right to assistance—or of any other norm of international law—that it deems
threats to peace. However, no state acting solitarily—nor even a regional organization—can arrogate the powers of the Security Council.
In March–June 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization launched a continuous campaign of severe and sustained aerial attacks against Yugoslavia, with
a view to compelling a settlement of the issue of Kosovo. It is true that prior to
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the attacks, in Resolution 1199 (1998), the Security Council, acting under chapter VII of the Charter, had affirmed that “the deterioration of the situation in
Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, constitutes a threat to peace and secu67
rity in the region.” That affirmation was repeated in Resolution 1203 (1998),
68
also based on chapter VII. Resolution 1199 noted a Yugoslav commitment “to
ensure full and unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations, the ICRC
and the UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees], and delivery of hu69
manitarian supplies.” The Security Council, alarmed by what it termed an “impending humanitarian catastrophe” in Kosovo, was fully competent to take or
authorize enforcement action against Yugoslavia, by identifying a threat to the
70
peace. However, absent authorization from the Council, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization had no right to resort to enforcement action. The members
of the Organization, individually or collectively, are entitled to invoke self-defense when faced with armed attacks by (or at least from) other states. But when
there is no armed attack against a sovereign state, and in the face of humanitarian repression amounting only to a threat to the peace, only the Security Council
is empowered by the Charter to use, or to authorize the use of, force.
It is true that the Security Council did not condemn the air campaign in Ser71
bia and Kosovo. All the same, inaction by the Security Council does not
amount to authorization for collective security measures, even by a regional or72
ganization. The language of Resolution 1244 (1999), adopted by the Security
Council following the agreement between the parties that ended the air attacks,
did not imply retroactive ratification of the use of force by the North Atlantic
73
Treaty Organization. In any event, the Security Council’s authorization
74
must be sought before, not subsequent to, regional enforcement action.
Otherwise, a permanent member of the Security Council could “shift the
burden of the veto” by acting unilaterally and then blocking any resolution
75
terminating the action.

It appears that the right to humanitarian assistance—as it exists under contemporary international law—is quite limited in scope. There is no doubt that there
is a growing demand by world opinion for extension of the right. Such an extension would require new international legislation, in the form of a new treaty,
which in turn should address the problems arising both in peacetime and in
time of armed conflict (either international or internal).
It is regrettable that instead of addressing this core issue, the substance of the
law of humanitarian assistance, recent debate has focused on the question of enforcement. Humanitarian assistance must not be confused with unilateral or regional “humanitarian intervention.” The moral duty of providing relief to
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innocent victims of armed conflict and natural disasters devolves on the entire
international community. Enforcement, where necessary, should be authorized
by the central organ of that community—the Security Council.

NOTES

1. See R. J. Hardcastle and A. T. L. Chua, “Humanitarian Assistance: Towards a Right of
Access to Victims of Natural Disasters,” International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 38,
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2. See Peter Macalister-Smith, International Humanitarian Assistance: Disaster Relief Actions
in International Law and Organization
(Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1985), p. 163.
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